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I. Introduction
In recent years public perceptions of crime have caused an increasingly ur-
gent appetite for public safety that prioritizes the proactive prevention of crime.1 
Though increasing the effectiveness of crime prevention often requires more in-
trusive policing methods, these tactics have generally been met with a collective 
acceptance of the concessions necessary for comprehensive safety. In other 
words, despite the reality that thwarting future crime requires targeting present-
ly innocent individuals, any meaningful outcry has largely been limited to legal 
scholars and defence advocates. This article will argue that as police capacity 
for the prevention of crime increases, the legal protective counterpoint afforded 
suspects in the form of procedural safeguards must also be expanded.
The article will begin by briefly highlighting changing attitudes toward crime 
control, before explaining one of the popular, emergent forms of crime preven-
tion, namely the practice of predictive policing. Predictive policing is a method 
gaining momentum in Europe that relies on existing theories of criminology en-
hanced by quickly advancing technology, most often artificial intelligence (AI). 
Due to the emerging nature of this technology, the article will approach the topic 
of predictive policing in a general manner, taking examples from European and 
EU law, as well as from the United States where predictive policing is more 
commonly used. It will be the goal of the article to illustrate some of the more 
universal legal consequences of crime prevention. The explanation of predictive 
policing will lead to a deeper discussion on potential infringements of individu-
al rights, demonstrating that the methods used do not differ significantly from 
traditional methods of criminal investigation, but in contrast, do not confer any 
defence rights on subjects of preventative investigation. It will further argue that 
if and when legal protections are extended to the preventative investigation of 
crime, their effectiveness may be negated by the use of sophisticated technolo-
gy such as AI, which blurs established legal standards of fairness.
Finally, the article will posit that by extending the use of investigatory or co-
ercive methods to the general prevention of crime without ensuring proper legal 
safeguards, many of the established principles of criminal law as accepted in a 
democratic society are compromised in practice. This section will describe some 
of the foundational precepts of fairness that extend through the criminal justice 
system and stand at the core of the legal process. 
1 See David Garland, The Culture of Control (University of Chicago Press, 2001); also Ulrich Sieber, “The 
New Architecture of Security Law – Crime Control in the Global Risk Society,” 2018.
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II. Policing by prevention
Predictive policing is a quickly growing method of policing which falls under 
the umbrella of crime prevention, a means of crime disruption that aims to an-
ticipate and avert opportunities for crime before it can occur. Unlike the more 
familiar and prominent method of crime control in which police response is reac-
tive to the commission of crime, prevention requires a specifically constructed, 
forward-looking body of knowledge.2 The concept of crime prevention is not 
new, but the addition of AI and the availability of massive amounts of data have 
sophisticated the practice, allowing its scope to expand and evolve dramatical-
ly in recent years. Whereas prevention formerly relied on simple heuristics and 
vigilant police work, the integration of massive amounts of data has effectively 
made it possible to investigate crime before it is committed. The shift toward 
prevention has been ignited in part by a collective recognition and fear of the 
emergence and prevalence of cybercrime and international terrorism, and fuelled 
by the increase of populism around the world.3 Simultaneously, technology and 
the increasing availability and networkability of data have enhanced the ability 
of police to anticipate and thwart crime.4 The combination of a focus on crime 
prevention and an enabled reliance on data and technology has precipitated the 
adoption of an actuarial approach to preventing crime, in which the commission 
of crime is treated as an avoidable risk. 
Relying on information to anticipate future crime relies on the synthesis of 
discrete packets of data, or risk factors, which together may inform the prob-
ability of crime, in essence creating a criminal risk assessment. In other words 
predictive policing uses a form of actuarial science in which statistical calcula-
tions may be utilized to ascertain risk. The actuarial approach to crime control 
functions much like an insurance policy, in which public security is the collec-
tive good and crime the harm to be avoided.5 By conceptualizing crime as an 
assemblage of factors that make criminal behaviour more or less likely, risk is 
calculated based on the aggregate and spread across the population.6 Actuarial 
calculations are fed by vast troves of data, which compute all known relevant 
2 Brandon Welsh and David Farrington, The Oxford Handbook of Crime Prevention (Oxford University 
Press, 2012) pp. 3-12.
3 Supra Note 2 at 3-5. 
4 Litska Strikwerda, “Predictive Policing: The Risks Associated with Risk Assessment,” Police Journal: 
Theory, Practice and Principles, 2020, 1-15 at 5.
5 See Pat O’Malley, “Risk and Responsibility,” in Foucault and Political Reason (Taylor & Francis Group, 
1996). See also Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson, Policing the Risk Society (University of Toronto 
Press, 1997). 
6 de Laat, “The Disciplinary Power of Predictive Algorithms: A Foucauldian Perspective” pp. 321.
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factors to produce a risk assessment, in other words, to calculate the probability 
that an event such as crime will occur.7 This approach may be seen as efficient 
in that it does not indiscriminately target individuals and trigger fear of govern-
ment overreach, but also contributes to a utilitarian style of management cen-
tred on the efficient allocation of resources.8 Determining risk based on known 
information allows police to discard traditional patrols that rely on numerous, 
fruitless interventions and instead adopt information-led policing, or ‘targeted 
governance.’9 Though using information as a tool may offend a sense of privacy, 
it may be argued that the pervasiveness of technology in daily life makes its near 
invisible utilization in policing more palatable and less shocking to the average 
conscience. This article will refer to the functional aspect of predictive policing as 
actuarial or risk assessments, or predictive analysis, interchangeably. 
Even though anticipating crime by risk assessment is a scientific calculation 
produced by inherently objective means, it is complicated by the fact that crim-
inal behaviour is imbued with moral implications which may only be established 
by human decision-makers. Crime is an asocial behaviour we consider to be an 
exception or deviation from the norm, so predicting its occurrence is to attribute 
normative value to particular behaviours which together we believe make crime 
more likely.10 Therefore, a human must inform a machine which combination 
of risk factors are responsible for increasing the likelihood of crime, as well as 
their weighted relative values, divesting the process of total objectivity. Achieving 
objectivity is further complicated by the fact that as we seek to predict not yet 
committed crime, it is only possible to anticipate its occurrence using past infor-
mation on known crime, basing the risk factors on historical, proxy information.11 
Another important aspect of forming a risk assessment is that none of these 
factors alone make crime more likely, but rather it is the correlation between 
them.12 Therefore, the factors which may correspond to a criminal behaviour are 
each only a single discrete trait dependent on many others, capable of being 
dissected from the individual and made irrelevant.13 As will be described in later 
sections, this lack of individualization and context is of particular legal relevance 
7 See Haggerty and Ericson, Policing the Risk Society.
8 See Mariana Valverde and Michael Mopas, “Insecurity and the Dream of Targeted Governance,” in 
Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces (Routledge, 2004), 233-50. Also, Sieber, “The 
New Architecture of Security Law – Crime Control in the Global Risk Society.”
9 Id. at 245.
10 Id. at 243.
11 Jones, Criminology, pp. 93.
12 Supra Note 7.
13 Louise Amoore, “Data Derivatives; On the Emergence of a Security Risk Calculus for Our Times,” 
Theory, Culture & Society 28, no. 6 (2011): 24-43. pp. 35. See also, Galic, Timan, and Koops, “Bentham, 
Deleuze and Beyond: An Overview of Surveillance Theories from the Panopticon to Participation” pp. 20.
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in policing.14 Theoretically whether an individual may contain in his data profile a 
‘guilty’ or ‘innocent’ status is only but one characteristic in determining whether 
there is a higher risk of criminal behaviour, based on the presence of other fac-
tors.15 The actuarial approach, which monitors the relationship between proxy 
data rather than individuals, may appease a public that demands both safety 
and privacy simultaneously, 16 but it should raise red flags for criminal defenders. 
This essential quantification of right and wrong based on subjective factors and 
devoid of context is an initial inroad to bias in risk assessment.17
Finally, though mostly invisible to the public, the actuarial approach is more 
invasive than it may first appear. A data-based preventive system will inherently 
operate more effectively the closer it comes to having perfect information. The 
quest for full information necessitates the large-scale collection and use of per-
sonal and non-personal data, some of which may only be collected via covert or 
intrusive methods, prominently, “database policing”18 and algorithmic profiling.19 
The information collected will also be retained for correlating data retroactively, 
drawing a temporal connection from presently innocent behaviour to potential 
future evidence.20 As threats become more complex and our data more abun-
dant, the calculation required to make risk assessments becomes more intricate 
and granular and its targets more concise.21 As Section IV will discuss, this ‘sta-
tistical, objective’ approach has important consequences on legal processes. 
The following section will first explain how the actuarial approach to crime is 
applied as assessing risk in predictive policing. 
III. Predictive Policing
The practice of pairing the identification of likely risks with the active pre-emp-
tion of crime by police is the core function of predictive policing. With advanced 
calculating power, police may engage immense amounts of information in sec-
onds to develop risk profiles for individuals or locations and target these subjects 
14 For a discussion of surveillance, analogous to the argument on the piecemeal assessment of individ-
uals in predictive policing see, Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson, “The Surveillant Assemblage,” 
British Journal of Sociology 51, no. 4 (December 2000): 605-22 at 610-612.
15 Supra Note 8 at 42.
16 Supra Note 5 at 27.
17 Id. 
18 Supra Note 9 at 243.
19 European Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Preventing Unlawful Profiling Today and in the Future: A 
Guide,” Handbook (European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2018) pp. 19. 
20 Supra Note 14 at 29-30.
21 Supra Note 8 at 111.
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for increased patrol and police interaction.22 Predictive policing has numerous 
definitions based on its particular uses; however, for the purposes of this article, 
predictive policing refers to the use of historical and real time data to forecast23 
the risk that a location or individual is likely to be the center of a crime event, to 
which police agencies may choose how to purposefully divert their resources, in 
lieu of some other unknown threat. 24 As established, this form of predicting risk 
identifies correlations between factors that together make crime likely. Ultimately, 
the risk assessments are ranked to identify those subjects in the highest risk 
categories, which become the subject of police interest. 
Methods of predictive policing vary in function and degree of detail, predicat-
ed on the subject and level of analysis, and according to the technology used.25 
Generally, the broad categories of predictive analysis are assembled according 
to whether the goal of the prediction is to assess the risk of a crime by location, 
or as attributed to a particular, potential perpetrator.26 One theory underlying 
most predictive policing operations posits that analysing environmental factors 
makes it possible to predict likely locations for crime, as crime is the result of 
“built-in” environmental features.27 The most advanced methods of predictive 
policing build on derivative theories of crime mapping,28 but allow for better 
22 See Valverde and Mopas, “Insecurity and the Dream of Targeted Governance.”
23 Though forecast is a more scientific term for the analysis described herein (a method both reproducible 
and objective), prediction is the term utilized by law enforcement and the general body of literature. Therefore, 
there is no distinction to be inferred between the terms. See Walter L. Perry et al., Predictive Policing: The 
Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations (Santa Monica, UNITED STATES: RAND Corpo-
ration, The, 2013), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unilu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1437438. at 1.
24 Wim Hardyns and Anneleen Rummens, “Predictive Policing as a New Tool for Law Enforcement? Re-
cent Developments and Challenges,” Eur J Crim Policy Res 24 (October 23, 2018): 201-18.; see also Fieke 
Jansen, “Data Driven Policing in the Context of Europe, Working Paper” (DATAJUSTICE, May 7, 2018).; 
also Perry et al., Predictive Policing; also Guthrie Ferguson, “Policing Predictive Policing” at 1125.
25 For a discussion on the terminology and differing types of analysis, see United States National Insti- 
tute of Justice, “Crime Mapping & Analysis Program Extra Reading Material, Intermediate Crime Mapping 
Using ArcGIS 10.1,” May 29, 2016, https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/course-materials-crime-mapping-
using-arcgis-101.
26 Currently the most common purpose for predictive policing is for the prediction of crime by location. 
Though identification of individuals has been piloted in some jurisdictions, mainly in the US and UK, it has 
been met with decisive backlash for alleged violations of human rights. 
27 Mara Hvistendahl, “Can ‘Predictive Policing’ Prevent Crime before It Happens?,” ScienceMag.Org 
(blog), September 28, 2016. See also, Kristian Lum and William Isaac, “To Predict and Serve?” (Royal 
Statistical Society, October 7, 2016), https://rss.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1740-
9713.2016.00960.x. at 18.
28 Crime mapping, or a “heat map,” is the spatiotemporal mapping of crime by location to identify where 
crime concentrates. Leslie Kennedy, Joel Caplan, and Eric Piza, “Risk Clusters, Hotspots, and Spatial Intel-
ligence: Risk Terrain Modeling as an Algorithm for Police Resource Allocation Strategies,” J Quant Criminol, 
2011, 339-62. See Perry et al., Predictive Policing at 46-50. See also Spencer Chainey, Lisa Tompson, and 
Sebastian Uhlig, “The Utility of Hotspot Mapping for Predicting Spatial Patterns of Crime,” Security Journal 
21 (2008): 4-28.
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precision through the addition of new data points assessed and organized by AI 
enhanced software. Sophisticated crime mapping systems29 function on a mul-
ti-dimensional modelling system to provide an “abstraction of the real world.”30 A 
model is composed of an area map which is parcelled into small cells of a set di-
mension and assessed for the “presence, absence, or intensity of qualities,” that 
is any temporal, social, physical, or behavioural factors that may contribute to 
crime.31 The presence of each particular quality is measured on a single layer of 
the map, the layers are then stacked over one another to provide a multi-dimen-
sional map that identifies high-risk areas for crime events based on the com-
mingling of measured qualities.32 These data sets are informed by quantifiable 
physical and social factors as general as weather and population density, and 
range to socio-economic markers such as the location of publicly subsidized 
housing or the homes of known prior offenders.33 
With larger inputs of data, it is possible to get an increasingly closer view 
of “built-in” opportunities for crime that reflect relevant environmental factors, 
enabling the micro-targeting of crime hot-spots, for instance narrowing risk to a 
particular building rather than full city block. All of the relevant theories generally 
hold that by identifying the environmental factors that constitute opportunities or 
drivers of crime, it may theoretically be preventable.34 For instance, if a particular 
location, known for its pubs and twenty-four hour convenience store, is desig-
nated as high risk for violent crime, police may prioritize patrols in the area. Pro-
ponents of a social justice-oriented approach prudently propose that rather than 
use this information to target crime, it instead be used to improve the systemic 
issues that make a location a more likely target for crime. 
The theories underlying predictive policing are generally accepted as regards 
soundness of logic and effectiveness. However, with the increased capabilities 
accompanying the use of AI which allow the automatic processing of data by 
29 For additional analytical modelling techniques, see “Geographic Information Systems and Predictive 
Policing Application Note” (US Dept. of Homeland Security Science and Technology, August 2013). See 
also, Rohan George, “Predictive Policing: What Is It, How It Works, and Its Legal Implications,” The Centre 
for Internet & Society Blog (blog), November 24, 2015. Also, Guthrie Ferguson, “Policing Predictive Polic-
ing” at 1135.
30 Kennedy, Caplan, and Piza, “Risk Clusters, Hotspots, and Spatial Intelligence: Risk Terrain Modeling 
as an Algorithm for Police Resource Allocation Strategies.”
31 Idem.
32 “Geographic Information Systems and Predictive Policing Application Note.” at 1.
33 See Weisburd, “The Law of Crime Concentration and the Criminology of Place” also Perry et al., Pre-
dictive Policing.
34 For a more in-depth discussion of the statistical methods that are used for crime mapping, see Perry 
et al., Predictive Policing; also George, “Predictive Policing: What Is It, How It Works, and Its Legal Implica-
tions.”
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algorithms, that predictive policing has advanced very quickly. An algorithm may 
be defined as a “finite sequence of precise instructions that are implementable 
on computing systems” and by which data are assessed.35 In order for the al-
gorithm to attribute relative value to the data it is provided with, it is necessary 
that it has been trained on a human coded model36 which will indicate to the 
system the relative value of data points.37 A model must be built to represent 
the universe for which a risk assessment is intended, according to all known 
elements and relationships.38 The algorithm applies meaning and value to new, 
incoming data, based on the inferences drawn from the model.39 It may therefore 
be inferred that models and their constituent data are not universally applicable.
Many predictive policing software programs equipped with AI also have the 
ability to use machine learning, meaning that an algorithm can autonomously 
adapt its entire model in accordance with new data points.40 As all new relevant 
data are assessed for value and become a part of the model, the algorithm 
also subsequently adapts to reflect the new model, in essence re-coding itself.41 
Therefore, the predictive function is perpetually rebuilding itself as it learns. This 
automated or semi-automated process of discovering patterns and their relative 
distributions42 is based on data mining; the process of searching and sorting 
electronically stored data to generate new information. 43 Though it is possible 
to have too much data, the machine learning function is also generally adept at 
discarding irrelevant or ‘noisy data.’44 Much of the discussion on biases in risk 
assessment focuses on human error and subjectivity. However, many biases are 
self-learned by the system, due to its ability to autonomously make complicated 
inferences and adjust its model. Just as humans add subjectivity in coding the 
original metric for data value, indirect subjectivity may be inferred by a machine 
learning system over a short series of calculations.45 
35 Osoba and Welser IV, An Intelligence in Our Image at 4.
36 Supra Note 12.
37 Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction (New York: Crown, 2016).
38 Id. at 18-20.
39 Pasquinelli, “How a Machine Learns and Fails – a Grammar of Error for Artificial Intelligence” at 5.
40 Tzu-Wei Hung and Chun-Ping Yen, “On the Person-Based Predictive Policing of AI,” Ethics and Infor-
mation Technology, June 1, 2020.
41 Jessica Gabel Cino, “Deploying the Secret Police: The Use of Algorithms in the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem,” Georgia State University Law Review 34, no. 4 (2018): 1073-1102. See also Osoba and Welser IV, An 
Intelligence in Our Image at 5.
42 Supra Note 40 at 4.
43 Witten and Frank at 5.
44 Marco Mendola, “One Step Further in the ‘Surveillance Society’: The Case of Predictive Policing,” 
Leiden University Tech and Law Center, October 2016.
45 Mikhail Reider-Gordon et al., “Artificial Intelligence, Predictive Analytics, and Unlawful Discrimination.”
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The foregoing summarized the predictive analysis function of predictive po-
licing, whereas the actionable portion is more akin to traditional policing. Police 
may act on a risk assessment via increased patrols (allocating unassigned time 
to designated locations or using the time between calls for assistance), increas-
ing visible presence, and interacting with the community.46 Using the results of 
a risk assessment, police may choose to monitor particular areas or people 
meeting specific profiles, so to ensure that resources are devoted to the most 
likely sources of crime. Though both prediction and action leave sufficient room 
for error, the remainder of this article will address the potential legal effects that 
are created by the predictive analysis, or risk assessment, function. 
IV.1 Operational Risks
Few would argue that the prevention of crime is against our collective in-
terest, even if it requires that governments extend police discretion. Traditional 
policing generally follows the harm principle, in which power is rightly exercised 
when it prevents harm by one against another.47 This concept is apparent when 
exceptional police action may be taken to thwart reported or observed acts 
of violence. In contrast, predictive policing seeks to eliminate potential future 
crime and action is justified by a threshold probability of a crime’s occurrence. 
This preventative approach is much more akin to the precautionary principle, 
which generally applied to environmental law but more recently also to counter-
terrorism, states that the absence of concrete certainty of an event’s occurrence 
cannot alone justify inaction.48 Applied to criminal law, the principle would dictate 
that preventative action against potential crime may be justified in the absence 
of imminent or catastrophic threat. Unlike the direct cessation of imminent harm, 
this notion of acceptable pre-emption may be seen as a justification for predic-
tive policing.
An important caveat to the application of the harm principle however, is 
that in attempting to pre-emptively mitigate violence, new risks are created as a 
consequence.49 An example from the environmental context would be an overly 
46 See Perry et al., Predictive Policing at 57; also Hardyns and Rummens, “Predictive Policing as a New 
Tool for Law Enforcement? Recent Developments and Challenges.”
47 See Supra Note 5.
48 Matthias Borgers and Elies Van Sliedregt, “The Meaning of the Precautionary Principle for the Assess-
ment of Criminal Measures in the Fight Against Terrorism,” Erasmus Law Review 2, no. 2 (2009): 171-95.
49 Id; Also Supra Note 8. For a discussion on the appropriateness of applying pre-emptive risk mitigation 
in the context of criminal law, see Anna-Maria Getos Kalac, “Guilt, Dangerousness and Liability in the Era 
of Pre-Crime – the Role of Criminology? To Adapt, or to Die, That Is the Question!” (Biannual Conference of 
the Scientific Association of German, Austrian and Swiss Criminologists, Vienna, 2020).
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restrictive curb on pollution which as a result also limits the prolificacy of life-sup-
porting industry. This section will argue that to prevent crime via predictive polic-
ing, the greatest manufactured risk is the potential infringement of individual legal 
interests by police. The paper distinguishes a ‘traditional’ criminal investigation, 
one which commences following the commission of a crime, from a preventative 
investigation, which will be defined as the use of predictive analysis to anticipate 
and prevent future crime. The distinction is critical as with the onset of a tra-
ditional investigation particular protections are automatically triggered onto the 
suspects or subjects of the investigation to counterbalance potential intrusions 
by the state. These protections may include access to information and an at-
torney; formalized evidentiary collection methods; and the protection of privacy. 
Currently the concept of criminal investigation does not generally include 
the use of preventative investigatory measures and therefore suspects are not 
conferred the commiserate legal protections. The remainder of this article will 
address these protections in the context of crime prevention and posit that 
the effect of preventative investigations without them is an adverse effect, or 
manufactured risk, of predictive policing. Namely, the legal protections to be 
addressed are the standard of reasonable suspicion, the presumption of inno-
cence, and prohibition on discriminatory treatment. The article will conclude in 
arguing that in addition to extending these safeguards to preventative investi-
gations, they must also be adapted to accommodate the realities of using ad-
vanced technology for policing.
IV.2 The Standard of Reasonable Suspicion 
In traditional criminal investigations, the standard of reasonable suspicion 
(standard) is a legal protection provided citizens against arbitrary deprivations of 
liberty by requiring that a police intervention is justified.50 Formulating the stand-
ard in real time is required of police officers to justify an interaction with individ-
uals either during a criminal investigation or in the course of a routine patrol for 
reasons that include the observance of irregular behaviour or on the basis of 
more advanced information. This standard is important not only at the time of in-
itial police contact, but it also ensures a fair, future trial as the state must present 
an articulable argument for the arrest in court, which the charged individual will 
then have the opportunity to rebut.51 Though the principle of preventative inves-
tigation does not necessarily preclude the standard, the use of algorithmic risk 
50 David Lyon, Surveillance As Social Sorting, Privacy, Risk and Digital Discrimination, 2002 pp. 252-261.
51 Marianne F.H. Hirsch Ballin, Anticipative Criminal Investigation: Theory and Counterterrorism Practice 
in the Netherlands and the United States (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012).
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assessments makes enforcing the standard less straightforward. This sub-sec-
tion will highlight the ways in which AI as a policing tool interferes with the ability 
to provide an articulable, individualized suspicion, potentially compromising the 
proper application of the standard.52 
The standard of reasonable suspicion requires that police officers who are 
engaged in the stop and/or arrest of an individual must rely on the existence 
of “facts or information which would satisfy an objective observer that the per-
son concerned may have committed the offence,” based on all known circum-
stances.53 Reasonable suspicion in good faith alone is insufficient but rather the 
standard requires that a specific and concrete offence has or is occurring and 
there is reason to suspect the subject individual is implicated in its commission.54 
Therefore, inexact notions that do not provide an identifiable instance of crime 
but instead a blanket indicator of general harm are insufficient.55 An example of 
a blanket prediction may be only the vague warning that violence may occur, 
with no reasonably actionable information. Risk assessments provide the prob-
ability of crime as calculated on unseen data, which gives a general indication 
that crime is more or less likely as compared to elsewhere, for instance as in the 
designation of a ‘high crime’ area.56 Therefore, a risk assessment which finds 
it forty percent likely a robbery will occur in a particular neighbourhood may be 
considered little other than predicting a general harm is more likely here than 
there, with no clear nexus to an individual or specific act.57 This may warrant in-
creased patrols in an area, but will do little in supporting a reasonable suspicion 
justification for the stop of any given individual in the area. 58 Without properly 
specific information it may then be the case that any individual carrying a duffel 
bag in the hypothetical neighbourhood, not a suspicious behaviour, could be 
viewed as suspicious according to the assessment. Police stops predicated on 
52 The arguments provided will be applicable in both European and American jurisdictions, and are 
intended to be general, despite a large body of literature on predictive policing and risk assessments in the 
US context. 
53 Supra Note 45 at 13, citing Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, no. 15172/13, 22 May 2014, p. 21 at §88. 
See also Barrett, “Reasonably Suspicious Algorithms: Predictive Policing at the United States Border” at 
331.
54 Article 5(1)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
55 Supra Note 45 at 14.
56 The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the designation of a ‘high crime area’ may form 
an important part of the reasonable suspicion analysis. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, “Crime Mapping and the 
Fourth Amendment: Redrawing ‘High-Crime Areas,’” Hastings Law Journal 63, no. 1 (2011): 179-232 at 
199-200, citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
57 Supra Note 14.
58 Rosamunde van Brakel and Paul De Hert, “Policing, Surveillance and Law in a Pre-Crime Society: 
Understanding the Consequences of Technology Based Strategies,” Cahiers Politiestudies Jaargang 3, no. 
20 (2011): 163-92 at 166.
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such vague information are clearly deficient vis-à-vis the standard in terms of 
both a recognizable crime as well as identifiable persons. 
The issue of properly meeting the standard is a generally vexing one, often 
left to a case by case analysis, as no two situations are exactly alike. Police 
intervention should not be predicated on a risk assessment nor profile alone, 
but should be included as a part of the officer’s situational awareness. 59 The 
standard dictates that police must “be able to point to specific and articulable 
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant” a stop.60 Therefore, in addition to suspicion of the nexus between an 
identified crime and individual, the individual behaviour must warrant suspicion in 
light of the full context.61 Each relevant facet of the circumstances must corrob-
orate the officer’s suspicion as appropriately balanced in light of other factors.62 
In using a risk assessment as a corroborating fact this is especially important, as 
neither the calculations leading to the assessment nor the input data are known 
to the officer. 63
In the above hypothetical, the possession of a duffel bag alone is not suspi-
cious. In order to use this risk assessment as a part of justifying the intervention, 
other factors must corroborate the officer’s reliance, such as behaviour irregular 
for someone walking on the street.64 If an officer relies on this general risk as-
sessment alone, anyone carrying a bag in this neighbourhood may be consid-
ered suspicious and the suspicion is not particularized to a certain individual or 
particular profile.65 This would obviously lead to negligent policing at best, and 
at worst end in the violation of numerous individuals’ rights. Because predictive 
policing is the inherent pursuit of preventing crime that is anticipated but has not 
yet occurred, tools as powerful as a risk assessment should not be discarded, 
however due care must be used so their use adheres to legal standards.66 
59 Guthrie Ferguson at 287 citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
60 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, “Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion,” Emory Law Journal 62, 
no. 259 (2012): 261-325 at 286 citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968), which sets the standard of 
reasonable suspicion for a police stop.
61 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, “Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion,” University of Pennsylva-
nia Law Review 163, no. 2 (January 2015): 327-410 at 287.
62 Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “‘Plausible Cause’: Explanatory Standards in the Age of Powerful Machines,” 
Vanderbilt Law Review 70, no. 4 (2017): 1249-1301. See also Guthrie Ferguson, “Crime Mapping and the 
Fourth Amendment: Redrawing ‘High-Crime Areas’” at 207.
63 Danielle Kehl, Priscilla Guo, and Samuel Kessler, “Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System: As-
sessing the Use of Risk Assessments in Sentencing,” Responsive Communities Initiative (Berkman Klein 
Center for Internet & Society, Harvard Law School, July 2017), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRe-
pos:33746041 at 28.
64 Supra Note 62 at 326. See also Supra Note 61 at 287.
65 Supra Note 63 at 1263.
66 Supra Note 45 at 14 citing Guzzardi v. Italy, no. 7367/76 6 November 1980 at p. 35, §102.
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Finally, while adherence to the standard must be strict, it does not necessar-
ily need to meet the degree of specificity sufficient for an arrest.67 The retroactive 
accounting for a police officer’s actions is critical to the trial process and as 
stated at the beginning of this section, necessary for the defendant to challenge 
his charge.68 The use of AI and increased amounts of information makes it much 
easier for an officer to justify a reasonable suspicion analysis retroactively and 
it seems likely that a court will adopt the officer’s correct supposition based 
on untimely information over a defendant’s unprovable claim that the data was 
only later accessed.69 As in the hypothetical, the use of a general prediction of 
burglary to indiscriminately stop thirty individuals carrying duffel bags, to only 
later learn that the thirty-first individual had an outstanding arrest warrant for bur-
glary, could not retroactively justify his stop as a result of reasonable suspicion. 
As in all investigations, if the proper weight is afforded to observed behaviours 
and context, and AI is used as supplemental information, this risk should be 
manageable.
The foregoing endeavoured to show that the prevention of crime is not fa-
cially inconsistent with applying the standard of reasonable suspicion, as any 
criminal investigation relies on some degree of probability and officer discretion.70 
However, this section has aimed to illustrate that though AI is an invaluable tool 
for predictive policing, it must be used as a supplement to forming reasonable 
suspicion, rather than the foundation of police interaction. Though few courts 
have addressed the application of the reasonable suspicion standard to predic-
tive policing, it is clear that it will be highly case-specific and the use of AI for po-
licing must be tailored to fit the existing standard. The following sub-section will 
similarly demonstrate that the use of AI in the initial phases of risk assessments 
can also affect legal outcomes of policing. 
IV.3 The Presumption of Innocence
The presumption of innocence is a corner stone of criminal law and may be 
found in most international, regional, supranational, and national covenants.71 
67 Murray v. The United Kingdom, no. 14310/88 (October 28, 1994).
68 Barrett, “Reasonably Suspicious Algorithms: Predictive Policing at the United States Border” at 331.
69 Ferguson, “Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion” at 341-343.
70 Supra Note 52 at 252.
71 See Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights for the right to the presumption of in-
nocence. The presumption is found as statute and case law in the United States, best articulated by Taylor 
v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978); Article 11(1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and Article 14(2) 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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Though it is usually strictly interpreted as applying to the pre-trial and trial phas-
es of a criminal proceeding, it has a larger social and moral relevance.72 The 
presumption stipulates that a charged party be treated as innocent until ad-
judged by a tribunal and proven otherwise, and that the entire criminal process 
be conducted accordingly to ensure the impartiality of the proceedings.73 Be-
cause a charge prima facie implies that the charging authority, usually the police 
or prosecutor, has reason to suspect the individual is guilty, the presumption is 
a legal fiction intended to protect the impartiality of the trial rather than an actual 
inference of no factual wrongdoing.74 Upholding the presumption is intended to 
ensure the equality of arms75 between parties, recognizing that the ability of the 
state as moving party to make a case is often stronger than an individual due to 
its capacity to investigate, prosecute, and sentence.76 Though the presumption 
is generally considered to apply only after a charge has been issued, this section 
will argue that its application is also highly relevant to the prevention of crime. 
If predictive policing is the actionable risk assessment of future crime, any stop 
or arrest will be initially predicated on the anticipation of future guilt. The clear 
implication being that there generally can be no equality of arms between the 
charging authority and an individual who is required to defend himself against a 
charge of future culpability.
The respective placement of crime prevention as prior to a crime’s commis-
sion, and issuance of a criminal charge as beginning the criminal justice process, 
allows that the presumption is not triggered in the act of predictive policing. 
However, despite this, it is the very nature of preventive investigations that the 
actionable anticipation of crime also implies the actionable anticipation of guilt, 
this being the inverse of the presumption of innocence.77 This article will not 
72 Antonella Galetta, “The Changing Nature of the Presumption of Innocence in Today’s Surveillance 
Societies: Rewrite Human Rights or Regulate the Use of Surveillance Technologies?,” European Journal of 
Law and Technology 4, no. 2 (2013).
73 Supra Note 52 at 548; See also Elies Van Sliedregt, “A Contemporary Reflection on the Presumption 
of Innocence,” Revue Internationale de Droit Penal 80, no. 1 (2009): 247-67 at 249.
74 Liz Campbell, “Criminal Labels, The European Convention On Human Rights And The Presumption 
of Innocence” (University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper Series, 2012) at 16. See also Ferry 
de Jong and Leonie van Lent, “The Presumption of Innocence as a Counterfactual Principle,” Utrecht Law 
Review 12, no. 1 (January 2016): 32-49 at 34.
75 Equality of arms refers to the requirement that a defendant must be afforded full procedural equity with 
the prosecution. See Pataki & Dunshirn v. Austria, App. No. 596/59 and 789/60, report of 28 March 1963, 
Yearbook Volume 6, 1963. Also Gordana Buzarovska, “Interpretation of ‘Equality of Arms’ in Jurisprudence 
of Ad Hoc Tribunals and ICC,” SEEU Review 11, no. 1 (2015): 28-39. 
76 Andrew Ashworth, “Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence,” The International Journal of Evi-
dence & Proof 10 (2006): 241-79 at 249-250.
77 In comparing Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights to the presumption, Ashworth 
questions the legality of pre-trial detention in the case of exceptional powers granted in the prevention of 
terrorism. As he determines the need for strong terrorism prevention may weigh strongly in favor of reason-
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delve into the grey area between guilt and innocence. However, it will instead 
posit that by attributing guilt for future, potential crimes based on the commis-
sion of past crimes, predictive policing may violate the presumption. In most 
presently available predictive policing software, and even prior to the integration 
of AI, recidivism or the previous commission of a crime is generally perceived as 
a likely indicator of future crime.78 Therefore, an individual with a criminal record, 
regardless of the disposition of the charge, will be at a statistically higher risk of 
future guilt. Even those who previously were acquitted or served a full sentence, 
may be found as high risk due to their criminal record. This is a clear violation 
under the strict interpretation of the presumption.79 This section will describe 
the practice in predictive policing that, in reliance on police records to help form 
future risk assessments, may lead to violations of the presumption of innocence 
against those wrongly accused as well as those whose criminal sanctions have 
been fulfilled.
Predictive analyses rely heavily on static crime statistics such as arrest re-
cords, calls for assistance, or non-custodial stops.80 The maintenance of records 
varies by department, down to the detailed way in which an officer inputs data. 
Police may choose to record every interaction or only those in which there is an 
arrest. Some departments may have a culture or policy of over- or under-report-
ing crime to meet particular quotas, or may be selective in the types of crimes 
they report.81 Similarly, not all crimes are reported equally. Some departments 
may only include calls for assistance, rather than arrests. However, perhaps 
most pertinent to the arguments below, crime records, regardless of how they 
are recorded, are almost always static.82 That is, once an arrest is made or a 
charge filed, no future act will change the status of its historical record, as op-
posed to one’s employment status for instance, which can change many times 
over the course of a lifetime. Unlike the fastidious record keeping of the criminal 
justice system, the fact that one was briefly unemployed thirty years ago is of 
able pre-trial detention, this still raises questions of the presumption. Analogizing this argument to predictive 
policing may produce a weaker case for derogating from the presumption due to the weight of potential 
harms. See Ashworth.
78 See Supra Note 64.
79 “The presumption of innocence does not have any cognitive pretensions but prescribes the hypo-
thetical starting point of due process.” Van Sliedregt, “A Contemporary Reflection on the Presumption of 
Innocence” at 264.
80 See Lum and Isaac, “To Predict and Serve?” Also, Jeffrey Brantingham, Matthew Valasik, and George 
Mohler, “Does Predictive Policing Lead to Biased Arrests? Results From a Randomized Controlled Trial,” 
Statistics and Public Policy 5, no. 1 (2018): 1-6.
81 See P. Jeffrey Brantingham, “The Logic of Data Bias and Its Impact on Place-Based Predictive Polic-
ing,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 15 (2018): 473-86.
82 Perry et al., Predictive Policing pp 92. Also Guthrie Ferguson, “Policing Predictive Policing” pp. 1148- 
-1149.
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little value. Therefore, for the purposes of predictive policing, it is entirely plau-
sible that a decade-old arrest may be as relevant to a risk assessment as a 
month-old conviction.83
Similarly, many systems record stops or police interactions uniformly regard-
less of outcome. An officer’s good faith reliance on his suspicion regarding a par-
ticular crime which may or may not occur in the future, de facto means that the 
stopped individual is innocent at the time of the intervention and setting of the 
record. However, the record of this stop may still be included in the data used 
for future risk assessments. Based on the record of this interaction, the individ-
ual may be assessed at a higher risk level the next time he encounters a police 
officer.84 Even though no wrong was committed, the officer is likely unaware of 
the reasons for which the predictive analysis targets the individual as fitting the 
profile of a past offender; however, it may form part of his suspicion and justify an 
additional stop. This process is referred to as a feedback loop.85 Here it is already 
clear that though a preventive police intervention does not necessarily indicate 
one’s guilt, the officer’s inclination to stop the individual rather than someone else 
on the basis of a risk assessment implies that the individual is statistically more 
likely than another to be considered potentially guilty based on the fact he has 
been stopped in the past. 
This form of heightened police scrutiny is especially true for prior offenders, 
those with prior arrests or convictions, who are often considered to form a large 
contingent of potential offenders when included in a typical risk assessment.86 It 
must be acknowledged that the factors driving this could be either the initial driv-
ers toward crime, such as low socio-economic status or frequent contacts with 
police, or, as in particular jurisdictions, the formal profiling of previous offend-
ers.87 However, it is fairly clear that due to the static nature of criminal records if 
an individual is arrested and charged on a crime, this will always be an important 
component of a risk assessment.88 Even were we to find the perfect risk assess-
ing algorithm which properly ranked individuals according to actual risk level, it 
is difficult to believe that any assessment system built on relative values can be 
fair and accurate for all, when a weighted comparison will always value the prior 
83 This is an analysis of the processes and functions at a basic level. Some predictive software or even 
police databases may operate to higher and varying degrees of sophistication vis-à-vis the regular updating 
of information.
84 Dean Wilson, “Algorithmic Patrol,” in Big Data, Crime and Social Control, 2017 pp. 2.
85 Law Society Commission on the Use of Algorithms in the Justice System and The Law Society of 
England and Wales, “Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System” (United Kingdom: The Law Society, June 
2019) pp. 35. 
86 See Supra Note 64.
87 Idem.
88 Idem.
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offender as a higher relative risk. Therefore, this article argues that relying on data 
for prior crime may allow the inference that an individual who was charged but 
later acquitted will be algorithmically processed identically to one charged and 
found guilty, all other factors constant. This not only places the individual in the 
grey area between innocence and guilt, but also violates the presumption even 
in its strict interpretation.89 
The ECHR has held that the presumption of innocence applies to an indi-
vidual who has been acquitted of a crime, 90 including the prohibition on passive 
utterances of suspicion following an acquittal as well as formal acts which indi-
cate a refusal to accept one’s innocence.91 It should therefore follow that a future 
stop by police predicated in part on a past charge subsequently acquitted, were 
the motivation able to be proven, violates the presumption.92 Regarding the use 
of information in a law enforcement database, in S. and Marper v. the United 
Kingdom, the Court avoided applying the presumption to the retention of biom-
etric information of acquitted parties. However, the Court held that to be treated 
as guilty after having been cleared of an offence leads to a presumption against 
innocence and risks stigmatization.93 Even more importantly, the Court found 
that allowing the inclusion of acquitted individuals in a DNA database unfairly 
“enlarges the category of ‘suspect.’”94 
Unlike the retention of DNA data, the value of which comes from proactive 
querying, the autonomous and constant correlation of arrest records to deter-
mine “propensity to commit harmful behaviour” exceeds the intrusiveness as-
sessed by the Court in Marper.95 As an active practice, predictive policing would 
also be considered as constituting a formal act per the ECHR.96 An officer who 
then takes concrete action in partial reliance on the results of an algorithmic 
risk assessment clearly is acting beyond the bounds of a tacit suspicion.97 It 
is argued here that were the Court in Marper to address the automatic and 
indiscriminate searching of DNA samples for forming pre-emptive suspicion, as 
in predictive policing, it may have reached an expanded interpretation of the 
89 See Supra Note 45.
90 Supra Note 73 citing Sekanina v. Austria, No. 13126/87, August 25, 1993. 
91 See Campbell, “A Rights-Based Analysis of DNA Retention” at 7. Also Supra Note 73.
92 Supra Note 75 at 5-6, 21-23.
93 Supra Note 45 at 15.
94 The ECHR has referred to this as the ‘pérennisation de la catégorie de “suspect”,’ see Galetta, “The 
Changing Nature of the Presumption of Innocence in Today’s Surveillance Societies: Rewrite Human Rights 
or Regulate the Use of Surveillance Technologies?”
95 Supra Note 75 at 25. See also, Supra Note 45 at 15.
96 Supra Note 92.
97 Supra Note 93.
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presumption. Even with the outcome of Marper, it is well established that this 
type of “evidence-based” stigmatization98 extends well beyond the criminal jus-
tice system into applications for jobs, housing, and credit. In the case of policing, 
stigmatization may extend to whole communities.99
Though the presumption is traditionally tied to pre-trial and trial processes 
for charged individuals, the use of crime data for enhanced policing methods re-
quires rethinking its wider application outside the trial process. This sub-section 
argued that as a preliminary matter, the use of AI for processing data used in 
predictive policing relies on categories of data that imply culpability at the peril of 
incorrectly finding previously acquitted individuals to be a high risk for recidivism. 
This clear violation of the presumption of innocence sheds light on the imperfect 
means by which risk assessments are constructed and highlights the need for 
reforming prevention practices to bring them into line with the legal protections 
due individuals. The final sub-section will similarly address the ill-effects of using 
AI to create profiles in crime prevention, at the risk of discriminatory treatment.
IV.4 Discrimination & Profiling
The prohibition on discrimination (prohibition) is a generally accepted principle 
of law, in Europe enshrined in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. As established above, risk assessments are built upon an analysis of 
factors that are subjectively determined by humans to be relevant to the risk of 
crime. Therefore, like more traditional policing methods, it is impossible to com-
pletely rule out human bias or error.100 However, due to the machine learning 
nature of algorithms, several additional forms of bias may be present in risk as-
sessments. Unintentional bias, either of human origin or machine generated, may 
go undetected by the users of risk assessments, whereas in traditional investiga-
tions there should be some indication or record of discriminatory behaviour. In ad-
dition, because of the opacity of AI generated risk assessments it may be nearly 
impossible for an individual to satisfactorily prove that police actions against him 
violated the prohibition on discrimination. This section will describe the formation 
98 Gstrein, Bunnik, and Zwitter, “Ethical, Legal and Social Challenges of Predictive Policing” at 10. 
99 It is well acknowledged that in the United States’ system a conviction is followed by numerous ad-
verse legal consequences beyond custody, including ineligibility for benefits, student loans, and public 
housing; as well as social stigma and segregation. Courts have deemed these as civil consequences apart 
from the criminal punishment and therefore “collateral.” See David Wolitz, “The Stigma of Conviction: Co-
ram Nobis, Civil Disabilities, and the Right to Clear One’s Name,” Brigham Young University Law Review, 
no. 5 (2009): 1277-1340 at 1310-1315.
100 Bias has several definitions. This article refers to bias as “prejudice” or “intentional discrimination.” An-
drew Selbst, “Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing,” Georgia Law Review 52 (2017): 109-95 at 125-126.
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of risk assessments per the use of algorithmic profiling, the preferred method of 
predictive policing. It will then highlight the potential for discriminatory practices 
and violations of equal treatment inherent in its use, arguing that current practices 
and available remedies are not consistent with the prohibition.
Predictive policing is essentially a sophisticated form of traditional criminal 
profiling, generally defined as a technique by which information is processed 
to identify and correlate patterns to infer unknown or unobservable information 
about an individual or groups.101 For instance, the factors that may make a par-
ticular crime more likely, accessibility of a victim, motivation for crime, lack of 
target guardian, etc., in fact form the locational profile for an anticipated crime of 
theft.102 In applying environmental factors to fill out the profile for theft, an ideal 
location may include the constant flow of dense crowds in a train station, where 
several dimly lit passages are not covered by CCTV.103 Clearly, a general criminal 
profile may be constructed heuristically without complex technology or data. In 
adding a degree of sophistication to this method, algorithmic profiling is “based 
on the use of data stored in databases and information technology systems…
us[ing] different techniques to profile people based on correlations and patterns 
in data.”104 Algorithmic profiling uses the “statistical aggregation” of information 
to detect trends or patterns that may inform statistically accurate profiles of fu-
ture crime, rather than relying on causation linked to a particular ‘profile’ as in the 
profile for theft sketched above.105 
The difference between the traditional and algorithmic profiles is largely the 
amount of data and the ability to process it quickly and by advanced methods. 
Comparing the use of a profile pre- and post-crime, a traditional profile has 
the benefit of analysing an identifiable crime by which evidentiary factors may 
be accrued and built, whereas in the case of predictive policing, there is no 
101 European Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Understanding and Preventing Discriminatory Ethnic Pro-
filing: A Guide,” Towards More Effective Policing (Brussels: European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 
2010) at 9. See also van Brakel and De Hert, “Policing, Surveillance and Law in a Pre-Crime Society: Un-
derstanding the Consequences of Technology Based Strategies”, p. 173.
102 Hvistendahl, “Can ‘Predictive Policing’ Prevent Crime before It Happens?” For an in-depth explanation 
see also Perry et al., Predictive Policing. For an early study on the linkage between crime and environment, 
see Robert Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie, The City (University of Chicago Press, 
1925). Also, Nina Brown, “Robert Park and Ernest Burgess: Urban Ecology Studies, 1925” (Center for 
Spatially Integrated Social Science UC Santa Barbara, 2002).
103 John Eck and David Weisburd, “Crimes Places in Crime Theory,” Crime and Place: Crime Prevention 
Studies 4 (July 12, 2015): 1-33.
104 European Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Preventing Unlawful Profiling Today and in the Future: A 
Guide,” Handbook (European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2018) at 19. 
105 Yves Poullet, “Data Protection Webinar 2: Profiling” (Webinar, Council of Europe Directorate General 
Human Rights and Rule of Law Data Protection Series, Brussels, July 14, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=8qHO_DhpDbg&feature=youtu.be&fbclid=IwAR1Q4mVJjUvu8G9wdjMyLqlrUzP0Hn3JLCtqXso 
2Ev684W_D6VAFJg8D4kw.
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actual crime and therefore probabilistic correlations of proxy data provide the 
best available assessment. In contrast to the heuristic formulation of a profile, 
algorithmic profiling is the indiscriminate use of seemingly unrelated data to form 
inferences about yet unknown events without context. Though a profile may be 
a particularly effective investigative tool, especially for predictive analysis, the 
absence of context makes it operationally less exact.106 This may make parsing 
a profile for single traits more likely, such as indicators of race, gender, etc., 107 
which is unlawful and indicates discrimination, leading to the derogatory use of 
the term ‘profiling.’108 As in forming a reasonable suspicion, the added benefit of 
context is apparent. 
Similarly, the use of an assessment reliant on probability and proxy data for 
profiling in crime prevention is especially problematic. A profile generated by 
statistical regression, for instance, is likely too general to be accurate for the 
majority of the population.109 For instance, if a profile correctly predicts that one 
in five men of a particular race is likely to commit burglary by a certain age, four 
out of five men in the profile are innocent.110 This demographic subgroup may 
be treated disproportionally to the full population in a way that is not representa-
tive of reality.111 Though simplistic, the hypothetical makes clear that even when 
properly used by police, this non-specific form of profiling may promote a type of 
unintentional bias which leads to discrimination.
Discrimination is differential treatment toward an individual or group based 
on illegitimate grounds112 such as sex, race, colour, ethnicity, religion, and social 
106 European Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Understanding and Preventing Discriminatory Ethnic Pro-
filing: A Guide” at 59.
107 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Combating Racism and Discrimination in 
Policing, ECRI General Policy Recommendation No. 11, (2007) <https://rm.coe.int/ecri-general-policy-
recommendation-no-11-key-topics-combating-racism-a/16808b7639>
108 Though legitimate when properly used, profiling often means the targeting of individuals by visible 
traits, namely race. See Ric Simmons, “Quantifying Criminal Procedure: How to Unlock the Potential of 
Big Data in Our Criminal Justice System,” Michigan State Law Review, 2016, 947-1017 at 971-972. In the 
United States, the Equal Protection Clause stipulates that for race to be a valid consideration, it must be for 
a necessary and narrowly tailored use which achieves a compelling state interest.
109 Dirk Brand, “Algorithmic Decision-Making and the Law,” EJournal of EDemocracy 12, no. 1 (2020): 
115-32 at 123. Also Supra Note 45; For a discussion on linear discussion, see also University of Helsinki 
and Reaktor, “Elements of AI, How Should We Define AI?,” Online course, 2020.
110 Simmons, “Quantifying Criminal Procedure: How to Unlock the Potential of Big Data in Our Criminal 
Justice System” at 984.
111 Council of Europe Committee of experts on internet intermediaries, “Algorithms and Human Rights, 
Study on the Human Rights Dimensions of Automated Data Processing Techniques and Possible Regula-
tory Implications,” 2017 at 15.
112 European Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Understanding and Preventing Discriminatory Ethnic Pro-
filing: A Guide” at 15-16, citing Council Directive 2000/43/EC Implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ(L) 180, Article 2.
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origin, whereas another in similar circumstances is not so treated.113 Unlawful 
profiling based on an illegitimate ground may be the result of both direct or 
indirect discrimination.114 Direct discrimination is the knowing and purposeful 
differential treatment toward a group, often as the result of a particular policy. 
Arguably it is the most obvious manifestation of bias, as it is the stated rationale 
for a behaviour and should be easily traceable. In addition to being theoretically 
apparent, seeking legal remedy for instances of direct discrimination is relative-
ly easier to prove. Though initially straightforward-seeming, direct discrimina-
tion may lead to stereotyping or practices that prioritize efficiency at the cost 
of unlawful presumptions of guilt. Often direct and indirect discrimination blend 
in practices that become culturally imbedded and the discriminatory behaviour 
may no longer be only a matter of formal policy.
Whereas direct discrimination is generally apparent, making it somewhat 
combatable, indirect discrimination presents numerous hurdles to detection as 
well as remedy. Indirect discrimination is the differential treatment of a group 
based on non-discriminatory factors, but the effect of which is disproportionate 
as compared to others. As opposed to traditional police practices, algorithmic 
profiling is more likely to cause indirect discrimination. Indirect discrimination can 
be the unintentional result of using proxy data, as a machine-learning algorithm 
may easily infer traits that apply to protected groups and make assessments 
accordingly, even in the absence of an overtly discriminatory model.115 Therefore, 
in a neutral risk assessment that neglects context, for instance in designating 
a groups of neighbourhoods as ‘high crime,’ it would not be the overt policy 
that a certain group be specifically targeted, even if these neighbourhoods are 
exclusively inhabited by a particular group and therefore lead to their increased 
scrutiny by police. This neutral policy in focusing on high crime areas can lead to 
an ongoing pattern of discrimination against the resident group but also initiate 
attitudes and stereotypes that continue well into future policing. In addition, by 
autonomously correlating data, machine learning can create new generations of 
data, which are also then correlated, raising potential issues of privacy and data 
113 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 14.
114 In the context of United States law there are two forms of claims invoking equal protection which 
both may be the result of direct discrimination; 1) an individual officer acts in a way motivated by race; 2) 
selective enforcement toward a particular race is the policy of a department. See “Racial Profiling: Legal and 
Constitutional Issues” (United States Congressional Research Service, April 16, 2012) at 4. 
115 A dynamic algorithm refers to one which may update its model according to new correlations among 
data as a result of machine-learning capability. See European Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Preventing 
Unlawful Profiling Today and in the Future: A Guide” at 109. See also Simmons, “Quantifying Criminal Pro-
cedure: How to Unlock the Potential of Big Data in Our Criminal Justice System” at 975. 
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protection.116 Therefore, even in jurisdictions where protected data may not be 
collected or coded for policing purposes, it is impossible to rule out discrimina-
tion when relying on algorithmic profiling to create risk assessments.117 
According to the ECHR, derogations from the prohibition of discrimination 
are generally allowed when considered to be objectively and reasonably justi-
fied.118 The Court has held that this test is only satisfied when the discriminatory 
behaviour is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and the means are reasonably propor-
tionate to the goal.119 In the case of predictive policing and algorithmic profiling 
specifically, the legitimate aim is apparent; however, the technology utilized and 
the legal guidance on its use are unclear. It is therefore impossible to prove its 
use either proportionate or reasonably justified. This is further complicated by 
the fact that little conclusive data exist on the success rates of predictive polic-
ing. The Court recently held that when treatment of an individual is predicated on 
a protected characteristic, the test of objectivity and reasonability “must be in-
terpreted as strictly as possible.”120 Though little jurisprudence exists on predic-
tive policing, it may be surmised that the current use of algorithmic profiling for 
the prevention of crime may not be found as weighing strongly enough toward 
strictly reasonable without a better understanding of its operations and success. 
As mentioned above, enforcing the prohibition on discrimination in predictive 
policing is complicated by the difficulty of procuring a remedy for alleged viola-
tions. To claim discrimination the moving party must show that a state actor is 
acting according to a policy that intentionally discriminates according to a pro-
tected classification.121 In the case of predictive policing the state actor would 
be the police and the information on which the officer relies is generated by al-
gorithmic processing. In order to successfully show discrimination, the claimant 
must therefore then prove that 1) the AI is acting according to a discriminatory 
116 Council of Europe Committee of experts on internet intermediaries, “Algorithms and Human Rights, 
Study on the Human Rights Dimensions of Automated Data Processing Techniques and Possible Regu-
latory Implications,” 2017 at 13. See also Reider-Gordon et al., “Artificial Intelligence, Predictive Analytics, 
and Unlawful Discrimination.” Also Pasquinelli, “How a Machine Learns and Fails – a Grammar of Error for 
Artificial Intelligence.”
117 See Law Enforcement Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016.
118 Jim Murdoch and Ralph Roche, “The European Convention on Human Rights and Policing; A 
Handbook for Police Officers and Other Law Enforcement Officials” (Council of Europe, December 2013) 
pp. 18-20. 
119 European Court of Human Rights, “Guide on Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and on Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention – Prohibition of Discrimination” at 15-17.
120 Case of Lingurar v. Romania, App. No. 48474/14 (European Court of Human Rights April 16, 2019) at 
§68. 
121 Renata O’Donnell, “Challenging Racist Predictive Policing Algorithms under the Equal Protection 
Clause,” New York University Law Review 94 (2019): 544-80.
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algorithm, has undergone machine learning in a way that causes it to discrim-
inate, or the policing agency has programmed the algorithm with biased data. 
If successful on the first claim, the claimant must then 2) prove that there is a 
strong nexus between the state actor (policing agency) and the AI program or 
its developer and controller122 sufficient for a court to make a finding that this is 
state action and not private action.123 Because much of the discrimination in risk 
assessments may be built on proxy data or unclear designations of a non-spe-
cific nature, this may be difficult to prove.124 Even further, the complexity of AI and 
the proprietary nature of predictive policing software make it virtually impossible 
to show that a police officer was aware and knowledgeable on the algorithm or 
input data, let alone the average individual plaintiff. 
The foregoing three sub-sections have endeavoured to illustrate how the use 
of AI in crime prevention may hinder citizens’ ability to enjoy legal protection in 
the investigatory processes of crime prevention.125 Due to the lack of jurispru-
dence on the matter and the inconsistent application of predictive policing, much 
of the foregoing legal analysis is built on a generally accepted understanding of 
the way in which predictive policing operates in European and American jurisdic-
tions. Due to an expanding focus on crime prevention toward action resembling 
traditional criminal investigations, this article argues that the legal protections af-
forded the subjects of investigations must also be expanded. As was also made 
clear, the use of AI for policing may change accepted practices and standards, 
and therefore the legal protections must also be adapted. Finally, because the 
use of AI complicates policing in ways only partially understood at present, it is 
unlikely that their use will be legally acceptable without further guidance.
V. Notions of Fairness 
The foregoing discussion demonstrated that the traditional legal protections 
afforded the subjects of criminal investigations often do not apply to preventive 
122 For evidence of the large role of private companies in predictive policing, see Brennan Center for 
Justice, “NYPD Predictive Policing Documents; Documents Related to the NYPD’s Predictive Policing 
Trials and Programs,” July 12, 2019, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/nypd-
predictive-policing-documents.
123 See Supra Note 122.
124 For a discussion on the ‘black box’ problem of AI, see Pasquinelli, “How a Machine Learns and Fails 
– a Grammar of Error for Artificial Intelligence.” See also Supra Note 44 at 42-43.
125 Similarly, in the context of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, a claim may be 
made of indirect discrimination, in which a neutral rule or requirement is applied equally to everyone, but 
has an unequal effect on protected groups. See European Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Handbook on 
European Non-Discrimination Law,” Handbook (European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2010) at 29-31. 
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investigation, nor would the protections as currently constructed be fully suffi-
cient. This article began by discussing the concept of policing crime as a form of 
managing risk, in which harms may be avoided by targeted prevention. However, 
in adopting a pre-emptive approach to crime, as theorized in the precautionary 
principle, we must accept that mitigating known risk generates new forms of 
risk.126 Criminal law must therefore adapt to new forms of risk to adequately 
promote justice for all parties in the preventive investigatory process or we risk 
jeopardizing the traditional notions of our system. In this penultimate section, 
the discussion will reflect on three foundational notions of criminal justice that 
without care, could potentially be transformed or abandoned as a result of new 
modalities of policing. 
First, the reasonable suspicion standard was developed with the notion that 
objective officers observe behaviour by an unknown individual, to make real-time 
observations and draw their conclusions based on presently available informa-
tion.127 This is intended to ensure equality between individuals in the absence 
of some indication of wrongdoing. With the addition of advanced predictive po-
licing capabilities, suspicion may be formed prior to the observance of irregular 
behaviour and regardless of context, due to the monopoly on information pos-
sessed by the officer. In other words, reasonable suspicion may be circumvent-
ed or unofficially redefined with the added benefit of near limitless information. 
An otherwise innocent individual may become the subject of police attention due 
to the belief that noncriminal behaviour has suspicious motive.128 By allowing the 
standard to be weighted so disproportionately toward the police officer under-
cuts the rationale for the standard. We generally accept that police may require 
exceptional powers and information to perform their work, but the implication 
that an individual may be regarded as high risk based primarily on an officer’s 
outside knowledge of him exceeds the bounds of patrol and mirrors something 
more akin to unjustified surveillance. Within the formal usage of a risk assess-
ment based on set categories, the relative ranking of individuals129 against one 
another is virtually social sorting: that is, the categorization or classification of 
particular groups according to risk.130 In analogizing a stop and search to court 
room processes, the inequality of arms exceeds what we may consider reason-
able, especially in the absence of suspicious behaviour. 
126 See Borgers and Van Sliedregt, “The Meaning of the Precautionary Principle for the Assessment of 
Criminal Measures in the Fight Against Terrorism.” Also Supra Note 8.
127 Supra Note 61 at 326.
128 Idem.
129 Supra Note 7 at 321. See also, Julie E. Cohen, “Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure,” The 
University of Chicago Law Review 75 (2008): 181-201.
130 Supra Note 5 at 6. 
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Second, the increased adoption of predictive policing may require a change 
in how the presumption of innocence is applied in the criminal justice system. It 
is established that once an individual has been found guilty of a crime he is likely 
to receive some criminal sanction or punishment and indeed much philosophi-
cal thought has been given to the concept of punishment, two of the foremost 
methods of criminal sanction being rehabilitation131 and retribution.132 Both are 
intended to provide the individual the ability to serve a legally determined sanc-
tion, which acts also as a symbolic service of justice to society and to victims. In 
addition, rehabilitation serves as an opportunity to treat and restore an individual 
to his or her constructive role in society. Both forms may be rendered futile if 
following the conclusion of a sentence the individual remains effectively stuck in 
the grey area between guilt and innocence.133 Similarly, from a philosophical and 
practical standpoint, the deterrent effects of criminal punishment are lessened if 
sentences are not treated with strict adherence and respect by both parties. By 
releasing an individual following completion of sentence, only to treat him or her 
as disassociated from the general population weakens the legitimacy of pun-
ishment, in particular rehabilitation.134 To deprive the defendant of dignity even 
following the successful completion of court ordered sanctions erases legitimacy 
from the trial and sentencing process, and hinders the process of re-entering 
society.135 Much like the feedback loop phenomenon present in algorithmic pro-
filing, an emphasis on prior offenders that neglects to acknowledge time served 
amounts to stigmatization and increases the likelihood of recidivism.136
Indeed, the very notion of the presumption is to ensure equality between 
defendant and the state in the course of a trial. Adherence to the rule of law 
requires that the state functions to maintain public security while safeguarding 
131 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Introductory Handbook on The Prevention of Recidivism 
and the Social Reintegration of Offenders” (Criminal Justice Handbook Series, 2018), https://www.unodc.
org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/18-02303_ebook.pdf pp. 3-10.
132 Jacob Bronsther, “Two Theories of Deterrent Punishment,” Tulsa Law Review 53, no. 3 (2018): 461-96 
at 470-471.
133 Criminal records are largely accessible to the public in the United States. The Supreme Court recog-
nizes no per se constitutional right to the privacy of a criminal record; trials must be public; and the First 
Amendment provides the right to publish information on crime. The extension of this information to private 
companies has greatly expanded the ability for anyone to access another’s record. See Wolitz, “The Stigma 
of Conviction: Coram Nobis, Civil Disabilities, and the Right to Clear One’s Name” at 1317.
134 Some jurisdictions, such as the United States, include within the criminal punishment the physical 
distancing of the individual for crimes of a sexual nature for a set period toward indefinitely. The distancing 
is to be at all times disclosed to the public in what has been termed by critics as a means of shaming past 
sexual offenders. 
135 R.A. Lenhardt, “Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context,” New York University 
Law Review 79 (June 2004) at 47-48. See also United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment 
of Prisoners, Rule 4, Paragraph 1. 
136 Meijer and Wessels, “Predictive Policing: Review of Benefits and Drawbacks” at 1036.
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the legal interests of individuals against arbitrary treatment and limitless discre-
tion,137 via the protection of legal certainty.138 If the presumption does not apply 
outside the strict confines of the courtroom, the balance of power and individual 
autonomy shifts toward the state.139 This may even chip away at the principle 
of legal certainty.140 Therefore, by extending the presumption of innocence be-
yond the trial process, as advocated above, it may better act as the intended 
‘shield’ against arbitrary state interference, ensure the fairness of the criminal 
justice system, and uphold the philosophy underlying the purpose of criminal 
punishment.141
Third and finally, there are numerous efficiencies to predictive policing which 
rightly warrant optimism. However, as has been argued, many of the likely ad-
verse consequences have been neglected by regulators and policymakers, as 
well as by courts. The ECHR generally requires that to be lawful, the interference 
by police of an individual right must be both relevant and sufficient for the intend-
ed outcome.142 In order to justify the use of sophisticated preventative measures 
many potential pitfalls must be addressed. Currently, predictive policing relies on 
risk assessments that provide questionable levels of specificity, causing inaccu-
racies that may adversely affect individuals’ legal interests. A recent clue as to 
how the Court may weigh these factors comes from the District Court of The 
Hague, which found that the use of a particular predictive policing tool for the 
prevention of financial fraud could not be considered necessary in a democratic 
society.143 The Court found that in order to meet the fair balance required by the 
ECHR, the intrusion on individuals must be weighed against the value of the 
tool’s use. In this case the predictive software was found to be non-transparent 
in its processes and therefore not capable of verification as to its value.144 As 
predictive policing has to date achieved contestably modest results in preventing 
crime, without further information it may be argued as insufficient to justify prac-
tices that result in potential discrimination and unequal treatment of individuals. 
In the broader scope of criminal justice, the use of algorithmic profiling raises 
numerous questions of how we define due process. If we accept a definition of 
137 Brennan-Marquez, “‘Plausible Cause’: Explanatory Standards in the Age of Powerful Machines” at 
1289-1292.
138 Legal certainty requires that the law is foreseeable in its application and sufficiently precise. See 
Council of Europe, “Guide on Article 5 of the Convention – Right to Liberty and Security,” 2014, https://
rm.coe.int/1680700ab0 at 8-9. See also Bronsther, “Two Theories of Deterrent Punishment” pp. 473.
139 Supra Note 45 at 9.
140 Supra Note 52 at 8-12; 547-551.
141 de Jong and van Lent at 40.
142 Supra Note 119 at 18. Also Supra Note 52 at 546.
143 Supra Note 5 at 7-8.
144 Rb. Den Haag, 05-02-2020, ECLI:NL: RBDHA: 2020:865; See also Supra Note 5 at 7-8.
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due process in the strictly procedural sense only, namely that it does not apply 
beyond pre-trial and trial processes, the expanded discretion of police officers 
may not be warranted according to traditional notions of fairness. Predictive po-
licing that may result in discrimination can only be justified as necessary and pro-
portionate in a democratic society with adequate legal protections in place. As 
with the expansion of policing practices for counterterrorism in which inchoate 
pre-crimes are increasingly criminalized and carefully scrutinized, it is necessary 
that pre-emptive policing is matched with the protection of legal interests and 
available remedies. 
VII. Conclusion
This article has presented predictive policing as the result of a shift toward 
crime prevention as a preferred means of ensuring public safety. Though the-
ories of predictive policing have changed little over the past several decades, 
the addition of AI to its application has greatly increased the scope and reach 
of crime prevention. This article argues that enhanced crime prevention capac-
ity has created a new category of investigation, namely, preventive investiga-
tion. Though this often has an effect on individual legal interests comparable 
to traditional criminal investigations, preventive investigations do not trigger the 
adequate legal safeguards generally due suspects or defendants. The legal pro-
tections analysed in this piece are the standard of reasonable suspicion, the 
presumption of innocence, and the prohibition on discrimination. In addition, 
should these tenets of criminal justice be eroded by the use of advancing tech-
nological policing methods, the very notion of due process may be transformed. 
The article therefore posits that in order to effectively and lawfully use predictive 
policing to prevent crime, its application must adhere to the existing legal frame-
work and must properly address the technological consequences of preventa-
tive investigations.
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